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Catastrophe modelling and metaphors in financial markets:  
A reply to Etzion, Kypraios, and Forgues 
 








Abstract: We welcome Etzion et al.’s (2019) effort to critically assess the 
role of cat models in insurance markets, by combining a sociology of 
finance lens with statistical analysis. Nonetheless, we believe there are two 
flaws in their analysis. First, their interpretation of the model-as-engine 
metaphor, as well as the way they test for this metaphor, is questionable, 
in part because it is not clear what form of performativity (generic, 
effective, Barnesian?) is to be expected in the case of cat models and what 
constitute rigorous tests for these various forms of performativity. Second, 
we disagree with the broad conclusion drawn by the authors from the 
statistical analysis, in particular that the predictive performance of cat 
models is “not demonstrably better than guesswork” and hence, that such 
models are not (like) cameras. Overall, we find it hard to see how the two 
main points discussed by the authors – namely that “catastrophe bonds do 
not lend themselves to analysis through conventional sociological theories 
of financial markets” (p. 1) and that cat bonds are not appropriate risk 
transfer instruments to tackle sustainable development goals – are proven 
through their discussion of cat models via the model-as-engine and model-





Etzion, Kypraios, and Forgues (2019) have recently taken on the challenge of assessing the 
effectiveness of catastrophe bonds (‘cat bonds’) – a financial instrument used by insurers 
and reinsurers to transfer the risks associated to the underwriting of catastrophes and 
natural disasters to market investors (e.g., institutional investors, hedge funds). Using 
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insights from the sociology of financial markets and building on statistical analysis, the 
authors conclude that the “modeling which underlies catastrophe bonds is not demonstrably 
better than guesswork at predicting the financial consequences of extreme events.” (p. 1). 
They also warn against the use of cat bonds to meet sustainable development goals.  
We welcome the authors’ attempt to use a sociology of finance lens to discuss the 
value of cat bonds as financial instruments and their critical assessment of catastrophe 
models’ (‘cat models’) performance. At the same time, we believe that there are two flaws 
in their analysis. First, we disagree with Etzion et al.’ (2019) interpretation of the “model as 
engine” metaphor and challenge the way they use this metaphor to test for the role cat 
models play in the insurance market. Second, we disagree with many of the conclusions that 
the authors draw from their statistical analysis of cat models’ effectiveness. Before 
addressing each point in turn, we briefly remind readers of the ‘model-as-engine’ and 
‘model-as-camera’ metaphors.  
Metaphors about economic models: Models as engines and as cameras.   
In “The Methodology of Positive Economics”, Friedman (1953) defended the view that 
economics is an engine to make predictions about market outcomes. This view, however, 
does not imply that models have to accurately describe economic agents’ individual 
behaviours. The realism of behavioural assumptions is not important inasmuch as the 
theory is able to predict market outcomes (e.g., price, quantity at the equilibrium). Instead, 
Friedman suggested that economics could be judged along two criteria: simplicity and 
fruitfulness. 
In “An Engine not a Camera. How Financial Models Shape Markets”, the sociologist 
of financial markets, Donald MacKenzie (2006), highlights the performative relationship 
between economics and the economy. He argues that economics “is an engine, [but] in a 
sense not intended by Friedman: an active force transforming its environment, not a camera 
recording it” (MacKenzie 2006, p. 12). The ‘model-as-camera’ metaphor hence, refers to 
economic models’ ability to represent market behaviours. It expresses the idea that models 
mirror economic phenomena that pre-exist their (abstract) representations. The ‘model as 
engine’ metaphor instead refers to a performative view of economic models: economists, 
through their theorization and modelling practices, ‘construct’ the economic phenomena 
they seek to understand (e.g., they name, measure, and give shape to them).  
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Testing for the engine metaphor: are cat models ‘engines’? 
Etzion et al. (2019) interpret the model-as-engine metaphor as follows: “in the engine 
metaphor, (…), the theorization that underlies models also shapes what happens in 
markets.” (p. 19).  
 
Generic and effective performativity in the case of cat models 
At the most generic level, MacKenzie’s argument that economics is a performative engine 
means that economic models, when used by market actors (generic performativity), change 
the way markets work (effective performativity). Economics actively participates in the 
functioning of markets in two ways: i) by providing market actors with concepts and models 
that can be used like tools, for instance to compute prices, and ii) by changing economic 
processes (Gond et al., 2016). With these definitions in mind, one can see that even without 
a formal test or systematic qualitative study of market participants’ practices, the fact that 
insurers use cat models – even if they were to use them only for symbolic purposes – means 
that these models have a generic form of performativity.  
As for ‘testing’ for the effective performativity of cat model, such as test would 
require, in our view, a counter-factual case: for instance, an insurance market without cat 
models. We could then study whether the use of cat models by market actors makes a 
difference: for instance, do models change actuaries and underwriters’ daily practices? Does 
their use lead to significantly different market outcomes?  
 
Cat models and Barnesian performativity 
The model-as-engine metaphor can also refer to the idea of Barnesian performativity 
(MacKenzie 2006): when the use of models increases the correspondence between the 
theory and the phenomenon that the theory is meant to describe. While the notions of 
generic and effective performativity do not directly point to any increasing correspondence 
between the economic phenomenon and its theoretical representation, the notion of 
Barnesian performativity focuses precisely on the feedback loop between a phenomenon 
and its representation.   
Barnesian performativity seems to be the interpretation of the model-as-engine 
metaphor that the authors favour in this paper, since they explain that saying that cat 
models are (like) engines implies “that changes in the theorisation that underlies the models 
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generate corresponding changes in how market actors price the financial instruments 
predicated on these models” (…) (p. 26). Furthermore, when testing for this metaphor, they 
refer to the “linkage between the modelled losses (potential costs) and cat bond spread 
(potential benefits) would tighten. In other words, increasingly accurate modelling should 
translate into some measure of financial certitude…” (p. 27). We interpret this sentence as 
meaning that if cat models drive cat bond market prices then, as time passes, with models 
becoming more accurate, the spread between cat bonds and similarly rated corporate 
bonds should shrink. While such a view is not unreasonable, we would expect such a 
possible trend to have a minor effect, not easily observable from a short time series, given 
the persistent uncertainty around e.g. climate trends.  
The authors then write that, since “spreads are not at all related to changes in 
expected losses or in the underlying catastrophe risk models,” (…) “the factors that have 
been driving cat bonds over the past 20 years are not an outcome of financial theorization, 
despite the sophistication of catastrophe modelling. Cat models, unlike derivatives 
(MacKenzie & Millo, 2003) are not engines.” We struggle to follow the logic behind this 
conclusion. It is expected that the prices of financial products are influenced by, say, 
macroeconomic conditions. How does this observation invalidate the view of cat models as 
engines (in the Barnesian performativity sense)? Conversely, what kinds of econometric 
data would one realistically need to see, in order to conclude that models are indeed 
engines?)  
More importantly, in our view, applying the notion of Barnesian performativity to cat 
models means that the use of cat models contributes to ‘create’ a phenomenon that is 
closer to its theoretical depiction. Thus, in order to assess the claim that cat models are 
(like) engines, it is central to understand what kind of theory is embedded in cat models.  
Unlike many economic models, cat models are not meant to “record market 
behaviours” nor are they supposed to “encourage market actors to behave in accordance 
with [economic] theory” (p. 18). Cat models are much less close to economic theories than, 
say the Black-Scholes model. Cat models are constructed as representations of (a) the 
random processes by which the natural phenomena are generated and (b) the mechanisms 
through which these phenomena are mapped to insurance claims. Together, these two 
elements allow the calculations of probabilities of events of interest, such as the event that 
at particular cat bond is triggered and the corresponding expected loss. These probabilities 
 5 
consequently ‘inform’ the prices of cat bonds, but cat models themselves do not compute, 
or predict, cat bond prices. If economic theory plays a role, it is located in how exactly this 
‘informing’ works and is thus external to cat models’ structure. 
 There is a broad sense in the market in that cat model outputs would drive market 
behaviour – for instance, if cat models show that there is a larger probability of the bond 
being triggered, then investors would seek higher returns on investments in that cat bond. 
Yet, the link between cat model outputs and market behaviour is not rigidly dictated by 
economic theory; there does not seem to be a clear agreement between insurance 
practitioners as to how loss estimates generated by cat models are mapped to cat bond 
prices, even in the primary market (e.g. Bodoff and Gan, 2009). It is hence not clear that the 
notion of Barnesian performativity is applicable to cat models, unless we are ready to 
consider the possibility that the modelling of say, hurricanes, impacts on the probability of 
hurricanes.  
Testing for the ‘camera metaphor’ 
Eztion et al. (2019) explain that “In the camera metaphor, models are merely devices that 
help understand the reality of what transpires in markets. They are mathematical 
representations of market processes and produce knowledge.” (p. 19). A direct implication of 
this metaphor is that, for the authors, cat models – like cameras – must precisely and 
accurately record the behaviour of the phenomena they are meant to depict. In other 
words, cat models’ forecasts must have small confidence intervals and must “correspond 
with historical record” (p. 19). While we agree with Etzion et al.’s (2019) view that the 
“model as camera” metaphor conveys a representationalist view of models (and theories), 
and hence points to the criteria of precision and accuracy, we challenge the way they 
interpret their statistical analyses.  
 
Testing for ‘precision’ 
Etzion et al.  (2019) first consider whether catastrophe models are ‘precise’. They 
demonstrate that variations of key model parameters have a very high impact on the 
outputs of catastrophe models. For example, Figure 4 shows that, if the distribution chosen 
for a key random variable related to windspeeds (‘Vmax’) is set to its 5% and 95% confidence 
bounds, there is a very large variance in modelled expected loss costs. This is the vexing 
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problem of ‘parameter uncertainty’, which is well understood in the loss modelling and 
actuarial communities (e.g. Cairns, 2000).  
We welcome the clear illustration of such uncertainty by the authors. Nonetheless, 
we do not see how this justifies the conclusion that models are “indeterminate” or that they 
“don't predict better than guesswork” (p. 6). First, we note that wide confidence intervals 
do not imply that all values within them (e.g. between 0.5 and 1.5 in Figure 4) are equally 
plausible. While a frequentist construction of confidence intervals does not explicitly allow 
for assigning probability weights to the values they contain, central estimates are used 
because of their higher credibility, not as random guesses within confidence intervals. 
Second, there is a certain arbitrariness in how such uncertainty is represented. The width of 
confidence intervals depends on ad hoc values of the confidence levels: on could plausibly 
represent parameter uncertainty via the 80% or 99% confidence levels, with rather different 
results.  
Furthermore, we note that the choice of what is simulated as a random variable 
within a model and what is considered as a parameter (that is, a deterministic variable, 
whose chosen value may be ‘wrong’) is contingent on practical constraints and conventions. 
For example, an alternative technically valid way of representing uncertainty, would be to 
select a different distribution for Vmax within each simulated scenario, e.g. from the 
uncertainty set in Figure 35 of Risk Management Solutions (2013). As a result, the 
uncertainty depicted in Figure 4 would disappear – or, rather, be repackaged as higher loss 
volatility (possibly leading to higher triggering probabilities). This is not to claim that 
uncertainty in predicting extreme events does not exist (it does exist and it is high), but that 
care should be taken when interpreting constructs such as confidence intervals or 
intermediate variables. 
 
Testing for ‘accuracy’ 
Etzion at al. (2019) make the crucial point that the attachment probabilities generated by 
catastrophe models are not observable, but can be still validated via observed frequencies 
of cat bonds being triggered – in other words by cat models’ predictive performance. The 
authors demonstrate that the number of cat bonds triggered is much smaller than what one 
would expect, if the probabilities produced by cat models were accurate, concluding that 
the modelled attachment probabilities are overstated. 
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 While the conclusion is drawn correctly, we find the strength of evidence to support 
it exaggerated. First, we note that the data set involved is too small to provide reliable 
estimates of predictive performance. The attachment probabilities of 612 tranches are 
analysed. But these are not independent observations: natural catastrophes do cluster; 
triggering events in the same year are highly correlated as they are driven by the same 
events; tranches in the same deal will be sensitive to the same underlying event. Many of 
those tranches will either be triggered, or not, at the same time. Hence the effective sample 
size, in terms of information content, is much more modest. This is implicitly acknowledged 
in footnote 7, where the authors explain that, while their data collection stops at 2016, a 
large number of cat bonds may be triggered in 2017.   
 Furthermore, the reliability plot in Figure 6 is misleading. It appears that cat models 
perform very badly for higher forecast probabilities of attachment, for which no actual 
triggering events are observed. But, from Figure 5 we can see that there are very few deals 
that correspond to that range of attachment probabilities – hence the number of data 
points stuck at the horizontal axis are not particularly credible. The first few points on the 
bottom left of the graph, still showing an over-prediction of triggering events by cat models, 
give a more meaningful picture. 
 Finally, Etzion et al. (2019) conduct a simulation study to support their conclusion on 
cat models over-predicting triggering events. Unfortunately, this study is flawed. The 
authors justify their choice of a Poisson distribution by referring to Poisson processes, which 
are used in actuarial modelling to represent the numbers of loss events arising from a 
portfolio. However, the Poisson distribution is not a meaningful choice for the modelling of 
variables that only take values in the set {0,1}, which corresponds to the simulation taking 
place (a simple Bernoulli model could be used instead). This inconsistency drives strange 
modelling choices; in particular, the implicit condition 𝑝(0) = 1 − 𝑝(1), leading to equation 
(5), has no meaning in the context of the Poisson distribution.  
 A separate issue with the simulation is the assumed independence between 
triggering events, referred to above. The distribution of numbers of events is extremely 
sensitive to dependence assumptions, with even a small correlation between events 
changing radically the shape of the distribution (e.g. McNeil et al., 2015, Figure 11.1). 
Accounting for such correlation would lead to much greater spread in the distributions of 
Figure 7, making the observed event frequencies appear less implausible, given the model. 
 8 
Conclusion   
In their conclusion, Etzion et al. (2019) argue that financialization, exemplified by cat bonds, 
is not necessarily an appropriate path towards tackling the Sustainable Development Goals. 
This may well be an accurate assessment. Nonetheless, we find it hard to see how the point 
is proven through their discussion of cat models via the model-as-engine and model-as-
camera metaphors. 
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